|
This document presents details on the wealth and income distributions in
the United States, and explains how we use these two distributions as
power indicators. Some of the information might be a surprise to many
people. The most amazing numbers come last, showing the change in the
ratio of the average CEO's paycheck to that of the average factory
worker over the past 40 years.
First, though, two definitions. Generally speaking, "wealth" is the
value of everything a person or family owns, minus any debts. However,
for purposes of studying the wealth distribution, economists define
wealth in terms of marketable assets, such as real estate,
stocks, and bonds, leaving aside consumer durables like cars and
household items because they are not as readily converted into cash and
are more valuable to their owners for use purposes than they are for
resale (Wolff, 2004, p. 4, for a full discussion of these issues). Once
the value of all marketable assets is determined, then all debts, such
as home mortgages and credit card debts, are subtracted, which yields a
person's net worth. In addition, economists use the concept of
financial wealth, which is defined as net worth minus net equity in
owner-occupied housing. As Wolff (2004, p. 5) explains, "Financial
wealth is a more 'liquid' concept than marketable wealth, since one's
home is difficult to convert into cash in the short term. It thus
reflects the resources that may be immediately available for consumption
or various forms of investments."
We also need to distinguish wealth from income. Income is what
people earn from wages, dividends, interest, and any rents or royalties
that are paid to them on properties they own. In theory, those who own a
great deal of wealth may or may not have high incomes, depending on the
returns they receive from their wealth, but in reality those at the very
top of the wealth distribution usually have the most income.
The Wealth Distribution
In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated in a relatively
few hands. As of 2001, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned
33.4% of all privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the managerial,
professional, and small business stratum) had 51%, which means that just
20% of the people owned a remarkable 84%, leaving only 16% of the wealth
for the bottom 80% (wage and salary workers). In terms of financial
wealth, the top 1% of households had an even greater share: 39.7%. Table
1 and Figure 1 present further details drawn from the careful work of
economist Edward N. Wolff at New York University (2004).
| Table 1: Distribution of net worth and
financial wealth in the United States, 1983-2001 |
|
|
Total Net Worth |
| Top 1 percent |
Next 19 percent |
Bottom 80 percent |
| 1983 |
33.8% |
47.5% |
18.7% |
| 1989 |
37.4% |
46.2% |
16.4% |
| 1992 |
37.2% |
46.6% |
16.3% |
| 1995 |
38.5% |
45.4% |
16.1% |
| 1998 |
38.1% |
45.3% |
16.6% |
| 2001 |
33.4% |
51.0% |
15.5% |
|
|
|
|
Financial Wealth |
| Top 1 percent |
Next 19 percent |
Bottom 80 percent |
| 1983 |
42.9% |
48.4% |
8.7% |
| 1989 |
46.9% |
46.5% |
6.6% |
| 1992 |
45.6% |
46.7% |
7.7% |
| 1995 |
47.2% |
45.9% |
7.0% |
| 1998 |
47.3% |
43.6% |
9.1% |
| 2001 |
39.7% |
51.5% |
8.8% |
|
Total assets are defined as the sum of: (1) the gross value of
owner-occupied housing; (2) other real estate owned by the
household; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time and savings
deposits, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts;
(5) government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other
financial securities; (6) the cash surrender value of life
insurance plans; (7) the cash surrender value of pension plans,
including IRAs, Keogh, and 401(k) plans; (8) corporate stock and
mutual funds; (9) net equity in unincorporated businesses; and
(10) equity in trust funds. Total liabilities are the sum of:
(1) mortgage debt; (2) consumer debt, including auto loans; and
(3) other debt. From Wolff (2004). |
| Figure 1: Net worth and financial wealth
distribution in the U.S. in 2001 |
 |
In terms of types of financial wealth, the top 1 percent of households
have 44.1% of all privately held stock, 58.0% of financial securities,
and 57.3% of business equity. The top 10% have 85% to 90% of stock,
bonds, trust funds, and business equity, and over 75% of non-home real
estate. Since financial wealth is what counts as far as the control of
income-producing assets, we can say that just 10% of the people own the
United States of America.
| Table 2: Wealth distribution by type of
asset, 2001 |
|
|
Investment Assets |
| Top 1
percent |
Next 9
percent |
Bottom 90
percent |
|
Business equity |
57.3% |
32.3% |
10.4% |
|
Financial securities |
58.0% |
30.6% |
11.3% |
|
Trusts |
46.3% |
40.4% |
13.3% |
|
Stocks and mutual funds |
44.1% |
40.4% |
15.5% |
|
Non-home real estate |
34.9% |
43.6% |
21.5% |
|
TOTAL |
47.8% |
37.7% |
14.5% |
| |
|
|
Housing, Liquid Assets, Pension Assets, and Debt |
| Top 1
percent |
Next 9
percent |
Bottom 90
percent |
|
Deposits |
21.7% |
35.5% |
42.8% |
|
Pension accounts |
13.3% |
47.0% |
39.6% |
|
Life insurance |
12.5% |
33.5% |
54.0% |
|
Principal residence |
8.9% |
28.0% |
63.0% |
|
Debt |
5.8% |
20.1% |
74.1% |
|
TOTAL |
11.9% |
34.0% |
54.1% |
| |
| From
Wolff (2004). |
| Figure 2a: Wealth
distribution by type of asset, 2001: investment assets |
 |
| Figure 2b: Wealth distribution by type of
asset, 2001: other assets |
 |
Figures on inheritance tell much the same story. According to a study
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, only 1.6% of
Americans receive $100,000 or more in inheritance. Another 1.1% receive
$50,000 to $100,000. On the other hand, 91.9% receive nothing (Kotlikoff
& Gokhale, 2000). Thus, the attempt by ultra-conservatives to eliminate
inheritance taxes -- which they always call "death taxes" for P.R.
reasons -- would take a huge bite out of government revenues for the
benefit of less than 1% of the population. (It is noteworthy that some
of the richest people in the country oppose this ultra-conservative
initiative, suggesting that this effort is driven by anti-government
ideology. In other words, few of the ultra-conservatives behind the
effort will benefit from it in any material way.)
The fact that most Americans have little or no wealth except for
their house can be seen in the following bar graph from the Census
Bureau. Coming as it does from a bureau carefully monitored by the White
House, the report from which this information is drawn studiously avoids
any discussion of the concentration of wealth by talking in terms of
"median" household wealth. "Median" means that 50% of households have
more and 50% of households have less than the figure on the graph, so
the top is nowhere in sight. Nonetheless, the graph is highly revealing.
Notice also that this graph shows that black and Latino households have
far less wealth than do non-Hispanic whites, whether we are talking
about wealth in general or just home equity.
| Figure 3: Median net worth by ethnicity
and race, 2000 |
 |
Numerous studies show that the wealth distribution has been extremely
concentrated throughout American history, with the top 1% already owning
40-50% in large port cities like Boston, New York, and Charleston in the
19th century (Keister, 2005). It was very stable over the course of the
20th century, although there were small declines in the aftermath of the
New Deal and World II, when most people were working and could save a
little money. There were progressive income tax rates, too, which took
some money from the rich to help with government services.
Then there was a further decline, or flattening, in the 1970s, but
this time in good part due to a fall in stock prices, meaning that the
rich lost some of the value in their stocks. By the late 1980s, however,
the wealth distribution was almost as concentrated as it had been in
1929, when the top 1% had 44.2% of all wealth. It has continued to edge
up since that time, with a slight decline from 1998 to 2001, before the
economy crashed and little people got pushed down again. Table 3 and
Figure 4 present the details from 1922 through 1998.
| Table 3: Share of wealth held by the
Bottom 99% and Top 1% in the United States, 1922-1998. |
| |
Bottom 99 percent |
Top 1 percent |
|
1922 |
63.3% |
36.7% |
| 1929 |
55.8% |
44.2% |
| 1933 |
66.7% |
33.3% |
| 1939 |
63.6% |
36.4% |
| 1945 |
70.2% |
29.8% |
| 1949 |
72.9% |
27.1% |
| 1953 |
68.8% |
31.2% |
| 1962 |
68.2% |
31.8% |
| 1965 |
65.6% |
34.4% |
| 1969 |
68.9% |
31.1% |
| 1972 |
70.9% |
29.1% |
| 1976 |
80.1% |
19.9% |
| 1979 |
79.5% |
20.5% |
| 1981 |
75.2% |
24.8% |
| 1983 |
69.1% |
30.9% |
| 1986 |
68.1% |
31.9% |
| 1989 |
64.3% |
35.7% |
| 1992 |
62.8% |
37.2% |
| 1995 |
61.5% |
38.5% |
| 1998 |
61.9% |
38.1% |
|
Sources: 1922-1989 data from Edward N. Wolff, Top Heavy
(New Press: 1996). 1992-1998 data from Edward N. Wolff, "Recent
Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-98," Jerome Levy Economics
Institute, April 2000. |
| Figure 4: Share of wealth held by the
Bottom 99% and Top 1% in the United States, 1922-1998. |
 |
The Relationship Between Wealth and Power
What's the relationship between wealth and power? To avoid confusion,
let's be sure we understand they are two different issues. Wealth, as
I've said, refers to the value of everything people own, minus what they
owe, but the focus is on "marketable assets" for purposes of economic
and power studies. Power, as explained
elsewhere on this site, has to do with the ability (or call it
capacity) to realize wishes, or reach goals, which amounts to the same
thing, even in the face of opposition (Russell, 1938; Wrong, 1995). Some
definitions refine this point to say that power involves Person A or
Group A affecting Person B or Group B "in a manner contrary to B's
interests," which then necessitates a discussion of "interests," and
quickly leads into the realm of philosophy (Lukes, 2005, p. 30). Leaving
those discussions for the philosophers, at least for now, how do the
concepts of wealth and power relate?
First, wealth can be seen as a "resource" that is very useful in
exercising power. That's obvious when we think of donations to political
parties, payments to lobbyists, and grants to experts who are employed
to think up new policies beneficial to the wealthy. Wealth also can be
useful in shaping the general social environment to the benefit of the
wealthy, whether through hiring public relations firms or donating money
for universities, museums, music halls, and art galleries.
Second, certain kinds of wealth, such as stock ownership, can be used
to control corporations, which of course have a major impact on how the
society functions. Table 4 shows what the distribution of stock
ownership looks like.
| Table 4: Concentration of stock ownership
by wealth class in the United States, 2001 |
| |
Percent of households owning stocks worth: |
|
Wealth class |
More than $0 |
More than
$5,000 |
More than
$10,000 |
| Top 1% |
95.0% |
94.8% |
94.1% |
| 95-99% |
93.7% |
93.2% |
92.5% |
| 90-95% |
89.3% |
88.2% |
87.4% |
| 80-90% |
79.8% |
76.2% |
74.3% |
| 60-80% |
69.0% |
61.3% |
55.1% |
| 40-60% |
48.9% |
37.6% |
31.0% |
| 20-40% |
35.5% |
16.0% |
8.9% |
| Bottom 20% |
20.7% |
4.7% |
2.5% |
|
TOTAL |
51.9% |
40.6% |
35.9% |
| |
|
Wealth class |
Percent of all stock owned |
|
| Top 1% |
33.5% |
| Next 19% |
55.8% |
| Bottom 80% |
10.7% |
|
From Wolff (2004). Includes direct ownership of stock shares
and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, and IRAs,
Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts. All
figures are in 2001 dollars. |
Third, just as wealth can lead to power, so too can power lead to
wealth. Those who control a government can use their position to feather
their own nests, whether that means a favorable land deal for relatives
at the local level or a huge federal government contract for a new
corporation run by friends who will hire you when you leave government.
If we take a larger historical sweep and look cross-nationally, we are
well aware that the leaders of conquering armies often grab enormous
wealth, and that some religious leaders use their positions to acquire
wealth.
There's a fourth way that wealth and power relate. For research
purposes, the wealth distribution can be seen as the main "value
distribution" within the general power indicator I call "who benefits."
What follows in the next three paragraphs is a little long-winded, I
realize, but it needs to be said because some social scientists --
primarily pluralists -- argue that who wins and who loses in a variety
of policy conflicts is the only valid power indicator (Dahl, 1957, 1958;
Polsby, 1980). And philosophical discussions don't even mention wealth
or other power indicators (Lukes, 2005). (If you have heard it all
before, or can do without it, feel free to skip ahead to the last
paragraph of this section)
Here's the argument: if we assume that most people would like to have
as great a share as possible of the things that are valued in the
society, then we can infer that those who have the most goodies are the
most powerful. Although some value distributions may be unintended
outcomes that do not really reflect power, as pluralists are quick to
tell us, the general distribution of valued experiences and objects
within a society still can be viewed as the most publicly visible and
stable outcome of the operation of power.
In American society, for example, wealth and well-being are highly
valued. People seek to own property, to have high incomes, to have
interesting and safe jobs, to enjoy the finest in travel and leisure,
and to live long and healthy lives. All of these "values" are unequally
distributed, and all may be utilized as power indicators. However, the
primary focus with this type of power indicator is on the wealth
distribution sketched out in the previous section.
The argument for using the wealth distribution as a power indicator
is strengthened by studies showing that such distributions vary
historically and from country to country, depending upon the relative
strength of rival political parties and trade unions, with the United
States having the most highly concentrated wealth distribution of any
Western democracy. For example, in a study based on 18 Western
democracies, strong trade unions and successful social democratic
parties correlated with greater equality in the income distribution and
a higher level of welfare spending (Stephens, 1979).
And now we have arrived at the point I want to make. If the top 1% of
households have 30-35% of the wealth, that's 30 to 35 times what we
would expect by chance, and so we infer they must be powerful. And then
we set out to see if the same set of households scores high on other
power indicators (it does). Next we study how that power operates, which
is what most articles on this site are about. Furthermore, if the top
20% have 84% of the wealth (and recall that 10% have 85% to 90% of the
stocks, bonds, trust funds, and business equity), that means that the
United States is a power pyramid. It's tough for the bottom 80% -- maybe
even the bottom 90% -- to get organized and exercise much power.
Income and Power
The income distribution also can be used as a power indicator. As
Table 5 shows, it is not as concentrated as the wealth distribution, but
the top 1% of income earners did receive 20% of all income in the year
2000. That's up from 12.8% for the top 1% in 1982, which is quite a
jump, and it parallels what is happening with the wealth distribution.
This is further support for the inference that the power of the
corporate community and the upper class have been increasing in recent
decades.
| Table 5: Distribution of income in the
United States, 1982-2000 |
| |
| |
Income |
| Top 1 percent |
Next 19 percent |
Bottom 80 percent |
| 1982 |
12.8% |
39.1% |
48.1% |
| 1988 |
16.6% |
38.9% |
44.5% |
| 1991 |
15.7% |
40.7% |
43.7% |
| 1994 |
14.4% |
40.8% |
44.9% |
| 1997 |
16.6% |
39.6% |
43.8% |
| 2000 |
20.0% |
38.7% |
41.4% |
| |
| From
Wolff (2004). |
A key factor behind the high concentration of income, and the likely
reason that the concentration has been increasing, can be seen by
examining the distribution of what is called "capital income": income
from capital gains, dividends, interest, and rents. In 2003, just 1% of
all households -- those with after-tax incomes averaging $701,500 --
received 57.5% of all capital income, up from 40% in the early 1990s. On
the other hand, the bottom 80% received only 12.6% of capital income,
down by nearly half since 1983, when the bottom 80% received 23.5%.
Figure 5 and Table 6 provide the details.
| Figure 5: Share of capital income earned
by top 1% and bottom 80%, 1979-2003 (From
Shapiro & Friedman, 2006.) |
 |
| Table 6: Share of capital income flowing
to households in various income categories |
| |
Top 1% |
Top 5% |
Top 10% |
Bottom 80% |
| 1979 |
37.8% |
57.9% |
66.7% |
23.1% |
| 1981 |
35.8% |
55.4% |
64.6% |
24.4% |
| 1983 |
37.6% |
55.2% |
63.7% |
25.1% |
| 1985 |
39.7% |
56.9% |
64.9% |
24.9% |
| 1987 |
36.7% |
55.3% |
64.0% |
25.6% |
| 1989 |
39.1% |
57.4% |
66.0% |
23.5% |
| 1991 |
38.3% |
56.2% |
64.7% |
23.9% |
| 1993 |
42.2% |
60.5% |
69.2% |
20.7% |
| 1995 |
43.2% |
61.5% |
70.1% |
19.6% |
| 1997 |
45.7% |
64.1% |
72.6% |
17.5% |
| 1999 |
47.8% |
65.7% |
73.8% |
17.0% |
| 2001 |
51.8% |
67.8% |
74.8% |
16.0% |
| 2003 |
57.5% |
73.2% |
79.4% |
12.6% |
|
Adapted from Shapiro & Friedman (2006). |
Another way that income can be used as a power indicator is by
comparing average CEO annual pay to average factory worker pay,
something that Business Week has been doing for many years now. The
ratio of CEO pay to factory worker pay rose from 42:1 in 1960 to as high
as 531:1 in 2000, at the height of the stock market bubble, when CEOs
were cashing in big stock options;. It was at 411:1 in 2005. By way of
comparison, the same ratio is about 25:1 in Europe. The changes in the
American ratio are displayed in Figure 6.
| Figure 6: CEOs' pay as a multiple of the
average worker's pay |
 |
It's even more revealing to compare the actual rates of increase of the
salaries of CEOs and ordinary workers; from 1990 to 2005, CEOs' pay
increased almost 300% (adjusted for inflation), while production workers
gained a scant 4.3%. The purchasing power of the federal minimum wage
actually declined by 9.3%, when inflation is taken into account.
These startling results are illustrated in Figure 7.
| Figure 7: CEOs' average pay, production
workers' average pay, the S&P 500 Index,
corporate profits, and the federal minimum wage,
1990-2005 (all figures adjusted for inflation) |
 |
|
Source: Executive Excess 2006, the 13th Annual CEO
Compensation Survey from the Institute for Policy Studies and
United for a Fair Economy. |
If you wonder how such a large gap could develop, the proximate, or
most immediate, factor involves the way in which CEOs now are able to
rig things so that the board of directors, which they help select -- and
which includes some fellow CEOs on whose boards they sit -- gives them
the pay they want. The trick is in hiring outside experts, called
"compensation consultants," who give the process a thin veneer of
economic respectability.
The process has been explained in detail by a retired CEO of DuPont,
Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., who is now chair of the New York Stock Exchange's
executive compensation committee. His experience suggests that he knows
whereof he speaks, and he speaks because he's concerned that corporate
leaders are losing respect in the public mind. He says that the business
page chatter about CEO salaries being set by the competition for their
services in the executive labor market is "bull." As to the claim that
CEOs deserve ever higher salaries because they "create wealth," he
describes that rationale as a "joke," says the New York Times
(Morgenson, 2005, Section 3, p. 1).
Here's how it works, according to Woolard:
The compensation committee [of the board of directors] talks to
an outside consultant who has surveys you could drive a truck
through and pay anything you want to pay, to be perfectly honest.
The outside consultant talks to the human resources vice president,
who talks to the CEO. The CEO says what he'd like to receive. It
gets to the human resources person who tells the outside consultant.
And it pretty well works out that the CEO gets what he's implied he
thinks he deserves, so he will be respected by his peers.
(Morgenson, 2005.)
The board of directors buys into what the CEO asks for because the
outside consultant is an "expert" on such matters. Furthermore, handing
out only modest salary increases might give the wrong impression about
how highly the board values the CEO. And if someone on the board should
object, there are the three or four CEOs from other companies who will
make sure it happens. It is a process with a built-in escalator.
As for why the consultants go along with this scam, they know which
side their bread is buttered on. They realize the CEO has a big say-so
on whether or not they are hired again. So they suggest a package of
salaries, stock options and other goodies that they think will please
the CEO, and they, too, get rich in the process. And certainly the top
executives just below the CEO don't mind hearing about the boss's raise.
They know it will mean pay increases for them, too.
There's a much deeper power story that underlies the self-dealing and
mutual back-scratching by CEOs now carried out through interlocking
directorates and seemingly independent outside consultants. It probably
involves several factors. At the least, on the worker side, it reflects
an increasing lack of power following the all-out attack on unions in
the 1960s and 1970s, which is explained in detail by the best expert on
recent American labor history, James Gross (1995), a labor and
industrial relations professor at Cornell. That decline in union power
made possible and was increased by both outsourcing at home and the
movement of production to developing countries, which were facilitated
by the break-up of the New Deal coalition and the rise of the New Right
(Domhoff, 1990, Chapter 10). It signals the shift of the United States
from a high-wage to a low-wage economy, with professionals protected by
the fact that foreign-trained doctors and lawyers aren't allowed to
compete with their American counterparts in the direct way that low-wage
foreign-born workers are.
On the other side of the class divide, the rise in CEO pay may
reflect the increasing power of chief executives as compared to major
owners and stockholders in general, not just their increasing power over
workers. CEOs may now be the center of gravity in the corporate
community and the power elite, displacing the leaders in wealthy owning
families (e.g., the second and third generations of the Walton family,
the owners of Wal-Mart). True enough, the CEOs are sometimes ousted by
their generally go-along boards of directors, but they are able to make
hay and throw their weight around during the time they are king of the
mountain. (It's really not much different than that old children's game,
except it's played out in profit-oriented bureaucratic hierarchies, with
no other sector of society, like government, willing or able to restrain
the winners.)
The claims made in the previous paragraph need much further
investigation. But they demonstrate the ideas and research directions
that are suggested by looking at the wealth and income distributions as
indicators of power.
Further Information
References
Anderson, S., Cavanagh, J., Klinger, S., & Stanton,
L. (2005). Executive Excess 2005: Defense Contractors Get More Bucks
for the Bang. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies / United
for a Fair Economy.
Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power.
Behavioral Science, 2, 202-210.
Dahl, R. A. (1958). A critique of the ruling elite
model. American Political Science Review, 52, 463-469.
Domhoff, G. W. (1990). The Power Elite and the
State: How Policy Is Made in America. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Gross, J. A. (1995). Broken Promise: The
Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Keister, L. (2005). Getting Rich: A Study of
Wealth Mobility in America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kotlikoff, L., & Gokhale, J. (2000). The Baby
Boomers' Mega-Inheritance: Myth or Reality? Cleveland: Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A Radical View
(Second ed.). New York: Palgrave.
Morgenson, G. (2005, October 23). How to slow
runaway executive pay. New York Times, Section 3, p. 1.
Polsby, N. (1980). Community Power and Political
Theory (Second ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Russell, B. (1938). Power: A New Social Analysis.
London: Allen and Unwin.
Shapiro, I., & Friedman, J. (2006). New,
Unnoticed CBO Data Show Capital Income Has Become Much More Concentrated
at the Top. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Stephens, J. (1979). The Transition from
Capitalism to Socialism. London: Macmillan.
Wolff, E. N. (2004). Changes in Household Wealth
in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. Unpublished manuscript.
Wrong, D. (1995). Power: Its Forms, Bases, and
Uses (Second ed.). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
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G.
William Domhoff, unless otherwise noted. Unauthorized
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