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Friedrich Hayek
(1899-1992)
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If any twentieth-century economist was a Renaissance man, it
was Friedrich Hayek. He made fundamental contributions in
political theory, psychology, and economics. In a field in
which the relevance of ideas often is eclipsed by expansions
on an initial theory, many of his contributions are so
remarkable that people still read them more than fifty years
after they were written. Many graduate economics students
today, for example, study his articles from the 1930s and
1940s on economics and knowledge, deriving insights that
some of their elders in the economics profession still do
not totally understand. It would not be surprising if a
substantial minority of economists still read and learn from
his articles in the year 2050. In his book Commanding
Heights, Daniel Yergin called Hayek the “preeminent”
economist of the last half of the twentieth century.
Most of Hayek’s work from the 1920s through the
1930s was in the Austrian theory of business cycles, capital
theory, and monetary theory. Hayek saw a connection among all
three. The major problem for any economy, he argued, is how
people’s actions are coordinated. He noticed, as Adam Smith had,
that the price system—free markets—did a remarkable job of
coordinating people’s actions, even though that coordination was
not part of anyone’s intent. The market, said Hayek, was a
spontaneous order. By spontaneous Hayek meant unplanned—the
market was not designed by anyone but evolved slowly as the
result of human actions. But the market does not work perfectly.
What causes the market, asked Hayek, to fail to coordinate
people’s plans, so that at times large numbers of people are
unemployed?
One cause, he said, was increases in the money
supply by the central bank. Such increases, he argued in
Prices and Production, would drive down interest rates,
making credit artificially cheap. Businessmen would then make
capital investments that they would not have made had they
understood that they were getting a distorted price signal from
the credit market. But capital investments are not homogeneous.
Long-term investments are more sensitive to interest rates than
short-term ones, just as long-term bonds are more
interest-sensitive than treasury bills. Therefore, he concluded,
artificially low interest rates not only cause investment to be
artificially high, but also cause “malinvestment”—too much
investment in long-term projects relative to short-term ones,
and the boom turns into a bust. Hayek saw the bust as a healthy
and necessary readjustment. The way to avoid the busts, he
argued, is to avoid the booms that cause them.
Hayek and Keynes were building their models of the
world at the same time. They were familiar with each other’s
views and battled over their differences. Most economists
believe that Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (1936) won the war. Hayek, until his dying day,
never believed that, and neither do other members of the
Austrian school. Hayek believed that Keynesian policies to
combat unemployment would inevitably cause inflation, and that
to keep unemployment low, the central bank would have to
increase the money supply faster and faster, causing inflation
to get higher and higher. Hayek’s thought, which he expressed as
early as 1958, is now accepted by mainstream economists.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Hayek turned to
the debate about whether socialist planning could work. He
argued that it could not. The reason socialist economists
thought central planning could work, argued Hayek, was that they
thought planners could take the given economic data and allocate
resources accordingly. But Hayek pointed out that the data are
not “given.” The data do not exist, and cannot exist, in any one
mind or small number of minds. Rather, each individual has
knowledge about particular resources and potential opportunities
for using these resources that a central planner can never have.
The virtue of the free market, argued Hayek, is that it gives
the maximum latitude for people to use information that only
they have. In short, the market process generates the data.
Without markets, data are almost nonexistent.
Mainstream economists and even many socialist
economists now accept Hayek’s argument. Columbia University
economist Jeffrey Sachs noted: “If you ask an economist where’s
a good place to invest, which industries are going to grow,
where the specialization is going to occur, the track record is
pretty miserable. Economists don’t collect the on-the-ground
information businessmen do. Every time Poland asks, Well, what
are we going to be able to produce? I say I don’t know.”
In 1944 Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom to
warn his fellow British citizens of the dangers of socialism.
His basic argument was that government control of our economic
lives amounts to totalitarianism. “Economic control is not
merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated
from the rest,” he wrote, “it is the control of the means for
all our ends.” To the surprise of
some, John Maynard Keynes praised the book highly. On the book’s
cover, Keynes is quoted as saying: “In my opinion it is a grand
book.... Morally and philosophically I find myself in agreement
with virtually the whole of it; and not only in agreement with
it, but in deeply moved agreement.”
Although Hayek had intended The Road to Serfdom
only for a British audience, it also sold well in the United
States. Indeed, Reader’s Digest condensed it. With that
book Hayek established himself as the world’s leading classical
liberal; today he would be called a
libertarian or market liberal. In the
book’s postscript, “Why I Am Not a Conservative,” Hayek
distinguished his classical liberalism from conservatism. Among
his grounds for rejecting conservatism were that moral and
religious ideals are not “proper objects of coercion” and that
conservatism is hostile to internationalism and prone to a
strident nationalism.
In 1974 he won the Nobel Prize “for pioneering
work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for
penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social
and institutional phenomena.” This award seemed to breathe new
life into him, and he began publishing again, both in economics
and in politics.
1935. Prices and Production. 2d ed. Reprint. New
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975.
1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. Reprint. Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1972.
1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
1976. Denationalization of Money. London: Institute
of Economic Affairs.
1988. The Fatal Conceit. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
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